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Abstract 
The paper represents an interdisciplinary approach on service continuity of critical 
infrastructure (CI). The legal and technological arguments are taken into account with aim 
to illustrate crucial points of this aspect. The need to protect critical systems infrastructure 
is quite natural when we accept state security standpoint. In the recent years world leaders 
saw the need to protect such structures as gas, power, water and tele-communications 
networks. Protection is based on two pillars, the first is law and the second is technology. 
In both areas the development depends on the cooperation on the international level and it 
is the effect of the technological and legal experience. Security of energy critical 
infrastructure however is a challenge not only for institutions but also for legal and 
technological concepts. Firstly, state interest has to deal with private owners of CI. In fact, 
legal solutions has to be analyzed with much broader perspective within European legal 
experience. The paper will analyze how far and why the state should be responsible for the 
maintenance and protection of CI. Thus, the legal strategies towards CI are compared with 
the ideas of Elinor Ostrom’s governing the commons as way to find an effective solution. 
Secondly, on the technological level, the governing of CI is analyzed in the context of 
setting technical standards and recommendations. International and national 
standardization bodies are responsible for resolving safety and security problems. In that 
respect certain types of energy recommendations will be taken into account. The paper 
opens the discussion on the interconnectedness between technological and legal spheres 
and the importance of effective cooperation between them for CI security. 
 
Keywords: law, critical infrastructure, governing the commons 
 
1. Introduction 
A line between what is public and what is private becomes less visible in 
crucial situations. Without doubt this reflection moves us directly to legal 
considerations. The origin of our understanding what belongs to private law and to 
public law lies in the Antiquity. Our Roman predecessors, namely Roman jurist 
Ulpian, taught us that private law deals with the benefit of individuals (utilitas), 
whereas public law with the matters of commonwealth362. Indeed, then and today, 
the division is not a clear one. What remains valid is the criterion of differentiation 
used by Ulpian – utilitas – utility. The inevitable tension between private interest 
and public demand can be easily noticed in the case of securing indispensable 
critical systems and services. Among them energy infrastructure is one of the most 
important one. The comparative and interdisciplinary perspective of legal 
                                                          
362 Digesta, Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. I, ed. Krüger P., Berolini 1954 (further: D.), D. 1,1,1,1 
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experience and energy engineering lead us to the common good and self-responsible 
community as driving concepts in the decision making process regarding critical 
infrastructure. 
Nowadays „critical infrastructure” (CI) refers to a wide spectrum of systems, 
buildings, and services363. It is legislator who decides what will be covered by the 
legal definition of this term. What is to be a pure private enterprise today, tomorrow 
can be claimed critical infrastructure364. Thus, it immediately would start to be of 
great interest of the state and public law. In general critical infrastructure is defined 
as object, device, installation, service that is a part of a larger system and that is so 
vital for societal and economic life that any damage to it or lack of capacity can 
cause severe consequences for nation's economy, security, and health365. In the case 
of critical energy infrastructure the typical examples of CI are: power plants, 
energy, petrol or natural gas transmission systems, and distributors thereof. No 
matter when and where, energy supply and production was always treated as a 
crucial system for maintaining community and public order. In the case of critical 
energy systems we do now face problems and threats not only because of possible 
physical or cyber-attacks on the infrastructure but even due to natural conditions: 
extremely high temperatures, drought, and so on366. In the legal perspective no 
proper answer can be given to the question how to provide service continuity of 
critical energy systems without considering the state-citizen relations. From the 
technological point of view, the issue deals with the level of development of the 
elements of the infrastructure and with cooperation between many different entities 
located also outside one state extending to the interdependent international energy 
system367. The paper seeks to point out to the core problems of protecting critical 
energy infrastructure and to reveal ways of solving them. It applies both legal and 
technological point of view to present and analyze ways of dealing with the security 
of critical energy systems. We do believe that not only „who” but also „how” the CI 
will be protected remains an inevitable issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
363 Filiol E., Gallais C., Critical Infrastructure: Where we Stand Today, Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Information Warfare & Security; 2014, p. 47-57  
364 Vijayan J., Obama executive order redefines critical infrastructure, Computerworld | Feb 14, 2013 
365 Moteff J., Parfomak P., Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Iden-tification, CRS Report 
for Congress 2004 
366 Polskie Sieci Energetyczne, Komunikat z dnia 10 sierpnia 2015 r. w sprawie wystąpienia zagrożenia 
bezpieczeństwa dostaw energii elektrycznej, podjętych działaniach i środkach w celu usunięcia zagrożenia i 
zapobieżenia jego negatywnym skutkom oraz o wprowadzeniu ograniczeń w dostarczaniu i poborze energii 
elektrycznej na polecenie OSP. 
367 Luiff E., Klaver M., Critical infrastructure awareness required by civil emergency planning, IEEE 
Workshop on Critical Infrastructure Protection, IEEE, 2005 
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2. CI – types of ownership and models of governance 
The idea of a state-governed security program contains the presumption that 
private owners of critical infrastructure either are not interested enough in investing 
too much in their protection systems, or they are not able to protect themselves 
enough against new types of threats like cyber-attacks. Thus, modern regulations 
are following the idea that nowadays critical energy infrastructure can be protected 
against any attack or any damage only thanks to a centralized decision making 
process which requires an ongoing sharing of information between all holders of 
critical infrastructure368. Opportunities to attack CI are so great that there is a need 
for centralized governing that will enable the state to have a broad picture of what is 
going on in the entire state. The idea is: the more information the state will gather 
the better protection there will be. 
One shall consider how far and why the state should be responsible for the 
maintenance and protection of CI. Some conclusions can be obtained from the 
comparison of policy of three countries: USA, Poland, and Germany. If we talk 
about critical infrastructure the tension between private and public sphere is always 
to be considered. Not surprisingly, nowadays main part of the entire critical 
infrastructure belongs to private owners. In the USA they amounts to over 85% of 
the holders of CI – it is owned by them, operated or a combination thereof369. In 
Poland private owners are responsible for a significant part of CI. In Germany, 
however, CI is more broadly owned, operated and influenced by the state. 
In the USA there are private companies that own power plants both coal-
fired and nuclear ones. In Poland, like in the USA there are power plants that are in 
private hands. Power Plant in Pątnów, Adamów and Konin in which majority of 
shares belongs to a private owner. It produces 8,5% of national power capacity and 
it amounts to 2512 megawatts370. In Germany energy critical infrastructure is based 
on the unbundling policy of the European Union. Nevertheless, the division of 
energy market does not necessarily reveals the structure of ownership of CI. In fact 
the market is divided between four big companies which were divided by the state 
regulator: EnBW, E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall. However, they usually use under the 
special agreements utilities that are owned by municipalities371. Even in the EU 
policy towards vertical independence between participants of energy systems, 
remains valid the question about cooperation between private and public owners. 
The great influence of private and public ownership of energy and combination 
thereof is presented by the worldwide power capacity structure in the Figure 2. It 
                                                          
368 Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa: Program narodowy ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej, Warszawa, 
2013 
369 President Obama’s Executive Order 13636, February 12, 2013 
370 http://zepak.com.pl/pl/, access: 11.05.2016 
371 Bayer E., Report on the German power system, Version 1.0. Study commissioned by Agora 
Energiewende., RAP 2015 NIPP 2013, Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, US 
Homeland Security 2013 
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shows how inevitable is to ask about model of governing that will join the state 
structure with the private interest. 
 
Figure 2. Ownership of Worldwide Capacity of Energy
 
Source: own elaboration on the base of Energy Outlook Investment Report 2014: OECD/IEA 
2014 London, 3 June 2014 
 
The property regime of CI does influence the type of governance that should 
be conducted so as to provide service continuity of energy systems. On the example 
of the policy of those three countries one can distinguish two ways of providing the 
needed protection. In July 2015 Germany has promulgated the critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity regulation which deals also with the critical energy infrastructure. 
Energy companies are forced to introduce cyber security measures within two years, 
if not they must pay fines up to €100,000372. It is the first cybersecurity regulation in 
the world that is enforceable by economic penalty. 
In the USA in 2013 has been introduced a set of new regulations dealing with 
CI373. There has been established a new definition of CI and has been approved 
ongoing model of cooperation between state and private energy companies. The 
national program of CI protection in Poland formulated two years ago is following 
the idea of cooperation while it avoids the reward-penalty model374. The crux of the 
matter is to encourage private owners to be up to date with the newest measures of 
security especially of cyber security. It is to be done by constant information 
sharing groups. Participation in them should be considered prestigious: they 
together should feel responsible for the nation security and nation prosperity. The 
similar regulations in the USA and in Poland oblige federal administration in the 
USA or governmental ministers in Poland to provide communication network, set 
up meetings and create the atmosphere of working together for the common good – 
                                                          
372 IT-Sicherheitsgesetz Nr. 31 vom 24.07.2015, §14 (2)  
373 President Obama’s Executive Order 13636, February 12, 2013 
374 Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa: Program narodowy ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej, Warszawa, 
2013 
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public security. The approach is based on the assumption that any constraint or any 
flavor of duty will discourage private owners to willingly follow any security 
advises. Consequently, it will limit the protection to the necessary minimum and 
private owners will hide any possible lacunas in their security system375. Updating 
security of energy system is a costly burden. Prestige and social pressure could be 
not enough factors to encourage private owners to bear higher costs of conducting 
energy plant or an energy company. In Table 1 a comparison of governing the CI is 
shown. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Governing the CI 
Region Governing the Critical Infrastructure 
United States of America The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (1997) 
European Union European Program of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2006) 
Poland National Program of Critical Infrastructure Protection (2013) 
Source: own elaboration on the basis of official legal sources 
 
On the other hand, no one has said that paying €100.000 fine will be enough 
to compel private owner to invest probably more in e.g. cyber security. In the end, 
the price for updating security would plausibly pay users within monthly invoices. 
Law aims „to make men good not only through fear of penalties but also indeed 
under allurement of rewards”376. Both ways of policing the legal order are well 
founded in our legal tradition thanks to Roman legal thought. Two lines which now 
appear before us: the German with economic penalty and all others including 
American and Polish solutions which favor soft cooperation, for now exhaust the 
possibilities that are used to enhance cyber security of the energy infrastructure. 
 
3. CI – its way to the Polish regulation 
In fact a starting point for any legal solution is the definition of CI. The first 
definition of CI was issued by President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in the United States of America in 1997. Since then, similar regulations 
have been introduced in many countries. 
In the European Union (EU) the European Program of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (EPCIP) was brought to life in 2006. The program sets a general 
framework for the countries affiliated in the EU in terms of improving the 
protection of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI). The EPCIP is supported by 
regular exchange of information between the member countries, and addresses a 
                                                          
375 Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. I, Krüger P. [ed.], Berolini 1954 (further: D.), D. 1,1,1,1 
376 ibidem 
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wide spectrum of threats including natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activities, 
and others377 . The backbone of the EPCIP is the 2008 Directive on European 
Critical Infrastructures13. It establishes the procedure for identifying and assigning 
ECIs as well as a common approach for assessing the need to improve their 
protection. The directive has a sectorial scope, and applies only to energy and 
transport. As far as Poland is concerned, the CI regulations are founded on 26 April 
2007 Decree on crisis management. As the following, the National Program of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (NPOIK) emerged in 2013, and remains the state-
of-the-art guide in this area. 
The program defines the CIs and the measures of their protection. Since the 
CIs are often privately owned, the responsibilities of each side is also determined378. 
Critical infrastructure is defined as object, device, installation, service that is a part 
of  a larger system. Then, one of the entities can be identified as CI based on 3-stage 
selection process. There are two types of criteria used for CI assessment379:  
a) System Criteria – characterize the functions of an object quantitatively. They are 
defined for each type of infrastructure. 
b) General Criteria – characterize the results of failure or damage of the particular 
object. They include: loss of human life; economic loss; evacuation; loss of the 
service;  recovery time; international effects; uniqueness of the object.  
Each object, in order to be considered CI, must undergo three-level selection 
process, which includes:  
1. First stage – application of system criteria to recognize potential objects, 
installations, devices or services as CIs in a particular system.  
2. Second stage – verification if the object, installation, device or service is crucial 
for the security of the country, allows functioning of public administration or other 
institutions and businesses 
3. Third stage – the potential results of damage or breakdown of the potential CI are 
considered.  
 To the infrastructure that has undergone the first and the second stage, the 
general criteria are applied. So as to be recognized as CI, the infrastructure must at 
least fulfill two of them. The three-stage process of CI recognition is based on 
elimination and allows for selection of the most crucial infrastructure. After positive 
verification, the infrastructure is enrolled on the national list of CIs. The operation 
and protection of CIs is done on the basis of cooperation of the system operator 
(owner), who can be a private entity, scientific institution and the government 
administration. Each of these entities can take part in the protection of CIs. As far as 
the government side is concerned, the position of the host of the CI belongs to the 
                                                          
377 www.ec.europa.eu, access: 15.04.2015 
378 Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa: Program narodowy ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej, Warszawa, 
2013 
379 ibidem 
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minister responsible for the appropriate sector (each system type has an assigned 
ministry), who coordinates the management of the infrastructure at the country 
level. State marshals and city mayors have a different role to play. On the other 
hand, universities and other scientific institutions provide expertise for the 
improvement of the CI protection. Managing the CI is an ongoing process that 
involves cooperation of many parties, each of which has its own responsibilities. 
The involvement of the entities varies as well depends on the type of infrastructure 
e.g. province governor is responsible for a province hospital that is located in a 
particular commune. 
 
4. Security of energy systems and governing the commons 
Presumptions hidden at the back of modern governance of the critical 
infrastructure must be considered in the light of recent developments in governing 
the limited natural resources – commons 380 . In fact parts of critical energy 
infrastructure reveals to bear special characteristics that can make it a type of 
modern commons. 
Elinor Ostrom's researches on management of common-pool resources 
(CPR) and institutional approach towards public policy (IAD) have revealed that 
one cannot overlook how important is process of rule-making in seeking for 
common good381. Common Pool Resources (CPR) ‘refers to a natural or man-made 
resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use’. Originally it 
was used to describe natural resource systems like forests, rivers, or water basins382. 
In all dimensions it pertains to the problem of governing a crucial and limited 
amount of resource that is so important for a community that any abuse or damage 
caused to the resource will harm the whole community and will endanger its 
existence. 
G. Hardin in 1968 said that: the problem lies in the number of users of 
limited resource. In 1993 E. Ostrom instead showed that the problem of managing 
commons does not rely on a number of users, but it relies firstly on the limited 
nature of good, which a community needs, and secondly on a reasonable 
administration of the resource. The problem boils down to the question, "how to use 
the resource" rather than "how many people have to use it" in order not to exhaust 
it. 
As Elinor Ostrom has shown, the best way to govern, protect and provide the 
rules of usage of the resource which is endangered can be found by community 
itself. Community self-governance can bring better economical, cultural and legal 
                                                          
380 Ostrom E., Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 
University Press 1990 
381 ibidem 
382 ibidem 
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results than one-subject management. Her idea has been empirically confirmed in 
all other the world – from limited water basins in California, in Spain, via limited 
grazing lands in Switzerland, via limited fisheries in Turkey to irrigation systems in 
Sri Lanka, Nepal and to limited forests in Japan. In effect, she became the first 
women who received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009. 
Empirical experience made idea very powerful but in fact it confirmed that 
which was already present in the common good perspective. Human perfection and 
personal development is in the center of governing community. There are rules and 
institutional arrangements which can help every member become better than before. 
We can cite Aristotle who considered polis as a natural environment for 
human. He praised with force the flourishing self-governance of the city with 
multiple communities and legislative bodies which enabled every individual to have 
influence on rules governing the whole society383. 
In social-economic thought it was Friedriech von Hayek who has shown that 
in order to adapt to economic surrounding there has to be community which teaches 
behavior and which create spontaneous order independently of state power – it is 
the idea of order which rises as a natural effect of human cooperation and could not 
be imposed by any power384. 
Finally, there is also religious perspective. For example we can take catholic 
social teaching and that which was presented by Benedict XVI in his official speech 
in Bundestag. He says that community to set up good institutional rules must always 
respect the ecological surrounding but not only environment – also the ecology of 
man. It shows that social and political thought go through the same paths and 
presents values which last unchanged in various contexts385. 
We have to keep in mind that ownership serves to protect users of special 
and important resources and goods. Finally it enables society to share peacefully a 
great variety of resources. However, there has to be return to the perspective in 
which every owner is also the member of society and possesses goods important for 
the whole society. 
As it is presented by the Figure 3, the type of entity that holds the property of 
the crucial good is not separated completely from the nature of the protected good 
and from the know-how – the ways in which we can govern the commons. In fact, 
the evidence of Elinor Ostrom revealed that how we govern is far more important 
than who is holding the right: private entity or public one. 
 
 
 
                                                          
383 Politics, 1276b; 1278b; 1280b 
384von Hayek F., The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960, s. 59  
385 Benedict XVI, The Listening Heart. Reflections on the Foundations of Law, Reichstag Building, Berlin, 
22 September 2011 
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Figure 3. Overview on property rights framework 
    
  Source: own elaboration 
 
Critical infrastructure in fact has become a kind of commons – a limited 
amount of resource which is necessary for all community and which has to be 
protected against any form of destruction, so as to preserve the standard of living of 
the community386. Energy systems „fit major features of commons: they are a non-
excludable resource system, there are appropriation problems related to rivalry in 
consumption of essential services, coordination needs deriving from system 
complementarities, diffuse property rights and decision rights with respect to the 
resource system, and multiple purpose services contributing to disperse and 
conflicting stakeholder interests” 387.  
The inevitable tension between private interest and public demand of 
securing indispensable critical systems and services among which energy is one of 
the most important one, leads us to the concept of the common good and the self-
responsible community.  
Recent years have shown that states usually shape their energy policy 
moving from a governmental management of infrastructure to a liberal market 
model which is protected by a institution of a regulator388. Energy – critical source 
transmitted through critical infrastructure now usually is to be considered a mere 
commodity. The change has been made, along the line highlighted by Elinor 
Ostrom. The state seemed not to be effective and creative enough to ensure the level 
                                                          
386 Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa: Program narodowy ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej, Warszawa, 
2013 
387 Kunneke, RW & Finger, M ., The governance of infrastructures as common pool resources. [In:] Bauev J. 
[ed.], Workshop of the workshop, Bloomington (USA) Indiana 2009, pp.1-24 
388 Roelich K., Knoeri Ch., Governing the infrastructure commons: lessons for community energy from 
common pool resource management, SRI PAPERS 2015, pp.1-25 
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of investment and innovation and lower prices that can be achieved by the market 
rules389. In fact, the result is that energy sector is neither state governed nor the fruit 
of the free market operations. It is indeed a combination thereof which compels 
both sides to cooperate and adjust their demands with the good of the society. 
 
Figure 4. Classical concept of power energy system 
   
  Source: own elaboration 
 
To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows the structure of the classical electricity 
system. Electricity is generated, transmitted via the national grid and distributed to 
customers via regional distribution networks390. The formal structure of protecting 
CI is well founded. However, the problem lies in the practical effects of the 
prepared security structure. Generation and transmission of energy is usually 
considered to be in the public sphere. However, as it has been presented in the case 
of the USA and to some extent in Poland and in Germany private owners appear 
already in the process of  generation and transmission. When it comes to the 
distribution and supply even in Germany private owners are invited to take care 
about the CI which is the closest to the users although in the EU under the control 
of a regulator. Step by step the chains of energy infrastructure become more open to 
network competition rather than to "one-body" management would it be a state or a 
private owner. 
That structure of energy CI reveals the characteristics that are similar to the 
problems of commons: system management, capacity management, 
interconnectedness and interoperability. They are placed within the chain of energy 
process which is on the one hand now shifting from governmental control to the 
market governance and on the other hand which is becoming a globalized network 
of CI. All these compels to ask about involving local communities within these 
"blocks" of energy infrastructure391. 
The move from governmental to private governing in the case of distribution 
and supply has already created a simultaneous cooperation between public, private 
and the third sector – ie. self governance model392. The locally based action towards 
distribution and supply does not have to be dangerous for security and safety of CI. 
                                                          
389 ibidem 
390 ibidem 
391 Kunneke R.W., Finger M., The governance of infrastructures as common pool resources. [in:] Bauev J. 
[ed.], Workshop of the workshop, Bloomington (USA) Indiana2009, pp.1-24 
392 ibidem 
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What is more, it can be more flexible and adjust to the local needs and current 
security circumstances. Technical requirements of components of these „blocks” of 
energy process are vested in technical standards and recommendations that are open 
to anyone and which can help be up to date with the technological development and 
requirements of safe governing of CI. 
 
5. Technical standards and recommendations 
Legal experiences for service continuity of critical energy systems are 
strongly supported by technical standards and recommendations. These documents 
consist of    a core of rules for regular operations of such systems. Some 
recommendations for emergency situations are also included and proposed. In 
practice different supporting standardization bodies appear. It is possible to 
characterized the standardization bodies taking into account the application field as 
well as the territory of influences. A brief summary of standardization bodies for 
civil applications is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Overview on standardization bodies for civil applications
 
  Source: own elaboration 
 
It is well spotted that the output of standardization bodies is perfectly in line 
with needs of application for critical energy systems. The specific documents can be 
applied taking into account three basic pillars: general, electrotechnical and 
telecommunication. However in these documents some overlaps could also appear 
and furthermore the best practices of safety and security specialists shall be also 
applied. In some specific cases additional requirements should be applied taking 
into account another regulations e.g. in military field where the hierarchy should 
follow general schema NATO (NATO Standardization Office) → EDA (CEN, 
EDSTAR) → National MON (PKN TC 176) principles. 
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Schematic representation of legislative interconnections between standards 
and regulations is shown in Figure 6. Basically standards recommendations give an 
influence on specific territories. In addition some of them are called in specific 
decrees with aim to assure homogeneous and sustainable development continent, 
country or region. 
 
Figure 6. Legislative interconnections between standardizations and regulations
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The service continuity of critical energy systems depends mainly on 
electrotechnical pillar which is well interconnected with another pillars. As it has 
been illustrated in Figure 6 the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is 
the principal standardization organization interconnected with international level in 
the frame of United Nations (UN) as well as with other standardization 
organizations like European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC) relevant to Europe and Polish Commit-tee for Standardization (PKN) 
relevant to Poland. 
The IEC standards making process, similar to many other standards making 
processes, is handled by various technical committees (TC) or TC as they are called. 
The TCs are the key bodies that drive the standardization and comprise experts from 
the national committees. Each technical committee and its standardization efforts is 
vast and is carried out by various working groups within the technical committees. 
Technical requirements for service continuity of critical energy systems are 
principally introduced by three IEC TCs namely: 
x TC 8 – System aspects for electrical energy supply; 
x TC 64 – Electrical installations and protection against electric shock; 
x TC 81 – Lightning protection; and other relevant TCs and relative 
publications.  
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The TC 8 scope is to prepare and coordinate, in cooperation with other 
relevant TC/SCs, the development of international standards and other deliverables 
with emphasis on overall system aspects of electricity supply systems and 
acceptable balance between cost and quality for the users of electrical energy. 
Electricity supply system encompasses transmission and distribution networks and 
connected user installations (generators and loads) with their network interfaces. 
The following list contains a couple of examples on system related aspects and 
elements belonging to the overall process of electricity supply. The purpose of this 
non-exhaustive list is to illustrate, in which fields expertise is required within TC 8, 
in order to enable the committee to properly fulfil its given task. It is not meant to 
be a list of items to be standardised. Examples for main system aspects to be taken 
into account for service continuity of critical energy systems are the following: 
Electrical system reliability (planning, operating limits – capability, adequacy, 
system security), network responsibility (operational safety, security), 
communication (operational safety, security). 
The TC 64 basic rules of work are similar to the TC 8. In principal this 
committee is focus on protection against electric shock arising from equipment, 
from installations and from systems without limit of voltage; and for the design, 
erection foreseeable correct use and verification of all kind of electrical installations 
at supply voltage up to 1 kV a.c. or 1,5 kV d.c., except those installations covered 
by the following IEC committees: TC 9, TC 18, TC 44, TC 97, TC 99. In addition it 
is important to stress that the standards of TC 8 will not cover individual items of 
electrical equipment other than their selection for use, taking into consideration the 
appropriate products characteristics and classifications. Moreover the TC64 has got 
the safety pilot function: protection against electric shock. Therefore the respective 
publications in this field have the status of basic safety publications. TC 64 
understands itself as a system committee which sets the overall safety standards for 
protection against electric shock and, for installation, determines the characteristics 
for the selection of electrical equipment to enable the safe use of electricity and the 
proper functioning of the equipment in the installation environment. 
The TC 81 basic rules of work are similar to the TC 8. It has been established 
to prepare international standards and guides for lightning protection for structures 
and buildings, as well for persons, installations, services and contents. The objective 
of these standards are focus on: requirements development for design  and 
installation of lightning protection systems for civil structures; requirements 
development for protection against lightning of services entering the buildings; 
especially electrical and telecommunication lines; basic requirements development 
for protection against electromagnetic effects due to lightning; general guidance 
development to IEC member countries that may have need of such requirements; 
international exchanges that may be hampered by differences in national 
regulations. 
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These standards can be particular important taking into account needs of 
protection against transient surges appearing in the system. 
In addition each TC has own specific action plan correlated to the market’s 
needs. Principally the recommendations and standards prepared for service 
continuity of critical energy systems purposes should be carefully studied by safety 
and security specialists. The present state of art shows that a horizontal guide across 
all standards and recommendations could consist of an added value for safety and 
security problems. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The idea of the paper is to analyze the complicated structure both of legal 
aspect of governing the critical energy systems and the international network of 
cooperation between engineers who provide technological norms towards common 
way of dealing with CI. Interestingly enough, legal and technological issues were 
presented from the point of view of governing the commons which compels anyone 
to ask about rule-making and rule-following processes. Discussion with Elinor 
Ostrom's theory is usually methodologically limited to governing the natural 
commons. However, there is a place to make idea much broader, and extend it to 
the case of protecting safety and security of energy CI. The legal and technological 
processes in that respect are going twofold: one way is to move responsibilities 
from government level to private owners, the second way is a continuous 
globalization of rules and standards offered by the committees and international 
bodies. The aim was to examine the phenomenon of spontaneous cooperation 
between private and public sphere which breeds the question about the role of local 
communities and their influence for so a vital energy CI. The third way is focused 
on taking into account self-governance at the local level: in distribution, supply, 
transmission or generation. The aim was to examine the ways in which states shape 
the rules and conditions of governing CI in the perspective of governing the 
commons. 
On the base of present paper following conclusions could be formulate: 
x safety and security aspects consist of a multidisciplinary task which can 
be executed by experts only; 
x service continuity of critical energy systems need to have low-
organization procedures for regular and emergency cases; 
x critical energy systems need to have an individual approach for the safety 
and security provision which engages local community 
x documents produced by ISO, IEC, ITU consist of a good base to 
preparation an adequate safety level; 
x legislator shall with due diligence define Critical Infrastructure so as to 
protect private and public needs 
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x two ways of promoting security of CI: through penalties and through 
cooperation can be analyzed through the idea of common good and 
governing the commons 
x critical infrastructure security does not depend on the property regime of 
the systems, buildings, services, and so on, but it depends on the mode of 
governing the every single company, entity, etc. 
x further investigation and analyses are needed with aim to well describe 
horizontal interaction of critical energy systems safety and security. 
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